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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
limits of their own contract. The evil sought to be prevented, that
of fraud and collusion, by Section 167(3) of the Insurance Law is
equally present whether or not the accident occurs in other juris-
dictions.25  The Court of Appeals has stated: "It is not allowable,
to interpret what has no need of interpretation, and when the words
have a definite and precise meaning, to go elsewhere in search of
conjecture, in order to restrict or extend the meaning." 26
)X
PROPERTY- CONDEMNATION -COVENANT OF QUIET ENJOY-
MENT.-Plaintiff-lessee brought an action for breach of covenant of
quiet enjoyment. The lease contained a provision that, in the event
of condemnation, the term would end and the lessee would not par-
ticipate in the award. Prior to the execution of the lease, defendant-
lessor had some inconclusive negotiations with the City of New York
looking to a sale of the property. Subsequent to the execution of the
lease, the defendant-lessor gave the City an option to purchase any
award resulting from condemnation proceedings. Thereafter, the
property was condemned and the City exercised its option. Plaintiff
alleged that the defendant's co-operation in giving the option consti-
tuted a breach of covenant. The Court of Appeals held that the de-
fendant's action did not constitute interference with the plaintiff's
possessory rights, and that the eviction was the direct result of the
sovereign's exercise of the right of eminent domain. Dolnan v.
United States Trust Co., 2 N.Y.2d 110, 138 N.E.2d 784 (1956).
A grantee of leased real property acquires title subject to the
lease, and the possessory rights of the lessee are not divested by a
sale to the City or a private individual.' The landlord has the duty
to protect the tenant's possessory rights, and any interference by the
landlord resulting in an actual or constructive eviction is a breach of
covenant of quiet enjoyment.2  However, when a tenant is evicted by
the sovereign's exercise of its power of eminent domain, no action
arises against the landlord.3 Protection is afforded to the landlord
25 General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Ganser, 2 Misc. 2d 18, 23,
150 N.Y.S.2d 705, 710 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (dictum).
26 McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N.Y. *593, *601 (1854), cited with approval
in Meltzer v. Koenigsberg, 302 N.Y. 523, 525, 99 N.E.2d 679, 680 (1951)
(per curiam).
I N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 223.
2 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 9 Ave.-31 St. Corp., 274 N.Y. 388, 9 N.E.2d
20 (1937); Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 178 App. Div. 19, 165 N.Y.
Supp. 122 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917); Times Square
Improvement Co. v. Fleischmann's Vienna Model Bakery Co., 173 App. Div.
633, 160 N.Y. Supp. 346 (1st Dep't 1916).
a N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § B15-37.0; Gallup v. Albany R. Co., 7 Lans. 471
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since the taking of the leasehold premises by eminent domain is an act
of the government separate and apart from the actions and intentions
of the parties. Thus, the tenant is ousted through no wrongful act
or default or failure of title on the landlord's part, and such a taking
is in no sense an eviction for which the landlord is responsible.4 The
tenant is, however, entitled to share in the condemnation award ac-
cording to the value of his remaining interest," unless a clause in the
lease terminates the tenant's rights. 6
In cases where the condemnation results from fraud or other fault
of the landlord, the evicted tenant may recover the difference between
the fair rental value of the unexpired term at the time of the eviction
less the rent reserved by the terms of the lease.7 Thus, where the
landlord's act of neglect has proved to be the cause of a building being
condemned when it could have been repaired for occupancy; the land-
lord breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment.8
Other cases indicate that a severe obligation has been imposed on
landlords to prevent breach of the covenant.9 In Ganz v. Clark,'0 a
landlord had conveyed title to a grantee who assumed the mortgage.
Subsequently, there was a default in payment of interest resulting in
foreclosure and eviction of the tenant. Although the default was not
caused by the bad faith of the grantor, liability was imposed for breach
of the covenant. The court stated that "unless the weightiest reason
be advanced whereby its breach may be condoned, the conclusion must
follow that the agreement shall be enforced or a penalty paid for its
violation." "1 Furthermore, actions have been upheld where landlords,
attempting to avoid the obligations of their leases, have vexed the
(Sup. Ct. 1872), aff'd, 65 N.Y. 1 (1875); cf. Ireland Real Estate Co. v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 72 Misc. 530, 131 N.Y. Supp. 978 (N.Y. City Ct.
1911).
4 Burke v. Tindale, 12 Misc. 31, 33 N.Y. Supp. 20 (1895), aff'd, 155 N.Y.
673, 49 N.E. 1094 (1898); Connor v. Bernheimer, 6 Daly 295 (N.Y.C.P.
1875). This would follow the general rule in the law of contracts that super-
vening impossibility is an excuse for nonperformance provided there is no
contributory fault on the part of the promisor. RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcrs§§ 457, 458, 460 (1932) ; 6 WiLusrsoN, CoNTRAcTs §§ 1939, 1959 (rev. ed. 1938).
5 Pabst Brewing Co. v. Thorley, 145 Fed. 117, 119 (2d Cir.) (dictum),
cert. denied, 203 U.S. 597 (1906) ; Folts v. Huntley, 7 Wend. 210, 215 (Sup.
Ct. 1831) (dictum).
6 Matter of the City of New York (Allen St.), 256 N.Y. 236, 243, 176 N.E.
377, 379, (1931) (dictum).
7 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 9 Ave.-31 St. Corp., 274 N.Y. 388, 9 N.E.2d
20 (1937) ; Mack v. Pachin, 42 N.Y. 167 (1870).8 Lindwall v. May, 111 App. Div. 457, 97 N.Y. Supp. 821 (2d Dep't 1906);
Burofsky v. Turner, 274 Mass. 574, 175 N.E. 90 (1931).
9 See Snow v. Pulitzer, 142 N.Y. 263, 36 N.E. 1059 (1894); Mayor of the
City of New York v. Mabie, 13 N.Y. 151 (1855); Al's 344 Ninth Ave. Corp. v.
Kernochan, 275 App. Div. 904, 89 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1st Dep't 1949) (per curiam).10252 N.Y. 92, 169 N.E. 100 (1929).
11 Ganz v. Clark, 252 N.Y. 92, 94, 169 N.E. 100 (1929).
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tenant with unsuccessful lawsuits, 12 or induced other tenants to enjoin
the tenant from deriving the beneficial enjoyment for which he had
contracted.1 3  It would seem, from the foregoing, that the language
employed by the court at Special Term 14 would apply to the facts of
the instant case. There, it was aptly stated that "if the covenant of
quiet enjoyment is to have any force it means . . . that the landlord
must . . . do nothing affirmative to deprive the tenant of possession
. . . and that means . . . nothing affirmative, not alone openly. and
directly, but also by subterfuge or indirection." 15
In the principal case, the validity of the option agreement between
the landlord and the City was not in dispute since such agreements
are specifically authorized by the Administrative Code of the City of
New York.' 6 The unique issue was-whether the defendant-landlord,
by granting the option to the City, co-operated to the affirnative
degree of creating an exception to the rule that the landlord is not
liable for breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment when the tenant's
eviction results from an exercise of the power of eminent domain.
The plaintiff sought to avoid the effect of the clause terminating his
right to share in the condemnation award by alleging that the co-
operation of the landlord was the direct cause of his eviction and,
therefore, a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Thus, the
Court declared it necessary to consider the intention of the parties.
This may best ". . . be ascertained from an examination of the . . .
[entire] lease, and not . . . [any] particular clause . . . ." 17 The
majority rejected the tenant's contention by stressing the termination
clause, and by characterizing the landlord's action as a mode of c6ni-
demnation. The Court declared that any other interpretation would
render ineffective the legislative intent under the Administrative
Code, 18 and that there was no causal relationship between the eviction
and the option agreement to purchase the condemnation award.
On the other hand, the minority contended that if any terms of
a lease are ambiguous or require interpretation, they must be resolved
against the landlord and in favor of the tenant.19 Further, the cove-
nant of quiet enjoyment should be construed as a protection to tenants,
12 See, e.g., Paddell v. Janes, 90 Misc. 146, 152 N.Y. Supp. 948 (Sup. Ct.
1915); Akerly v. Vilas, 23 Wis. 207 (1868).
13 See Williams v. Getman, 114 App. Div. 282, 99 N.Y. Supp. 977 (3d Dep't
1906) (per curiam).
24 Dolman v. United States Trust Co., 206 Misc. 929, 134 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup.
Ct. 1954).15 Id. at 932, 134 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
16 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CoDE § B15-30.0. The courts have previously dealt with
similar option agreements. Matter of the City of New York (Chrystie St.),
236 App. Div. 321, 258 N.Y. Supp. 243 (1st Dep't 1932).
17 Bovin v. Galitzka, 250 N.Y. 228, 232, 165 N.E. 273, 275 (1929).
I's N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § B 15-30.0.
19 Dolman v. United States Trust Co., 2 N.Y.2d 110, 120, 138 N.E2d 784, 790
(1956) (dissenting opinion) ; see 455 Seventh Ave. v. Hussey Realty Corp., 295
N.Y. 166, 65 N.E2d 761 (1946).
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not only from the lawful claims of third persons having title paramount
to the lessor, and the unlawful entry of the lessor, but also from any
interference by the landlord with the tenant's leasehold rights. There-
fore, the giving of the option was an act which the landlord was not
legally bound to do, and hence, a breach of the covenant. It would
then appear that the conclusion of the minority is logical. Public
policy, however, would seem to require the Court's decision.- To hold
otherwise might deter landlords from negotiating with the City and
curtail operation of the statute 20 where a leasehold interest exists.
However, the case should be strictly limited and freely distinguished.
)X
SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE - NEW YORK UNIFORM SUPPORT
OF DEPENDENTS LAW HELD CONSTITUTIONAL.-A proceeding was
commenced in California under the California Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act by a mother, resident of California, against her former
husband, resident of New York, to enforce support of their minor
child. The petition was forwarded to the New York Domestic Re-
lations Court. Pursuant to the reciprocity provisions of the New
York Uniform Support of Dependents Law that court ordered re-
spondent to make support payments by depositing specified sums into
court. On appeal, respondent attacked the procedure as unconstitu-
tional. In affirming the order granting support, the Court held that
the procedure did not violate the compact clause, the due process
clause or the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution.
Landes v. Landes. 1 N.Y.2d 358, 135 N.E.2d 562 (1956).
Prior to the enactment of reciprocal support legislation the rem-
edies available to a dependent where an obligor left the jurisdiction
were cumbersome, expensive, and rarely if ever accomplished the
desired social ends. In the main, criminal liability was ineffective.
Although a husband-father could be prosecuted under certain cir-
cumstances,' the result of such a prosecution was merely an added
financial burden upon the state. Often, the cost of extradition
discouraged prosecution. 2
The effectiveness of the civil remedies available to a dependent
was usually limited to those cases where the obligor could be located
20 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § B 15-30.0.
1 N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 50, 480.
2 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, ci. 2, provides for extradition of a felon "who
shall flee fron justice!' In many cases an obligor may not have fled fromjustice. He may have entered another state to secure employment. See
Brockelbank, The Problem of Family Support: A New Uniform Act Offers a
Solution, 37 A.B.A.J. 93, 94 (1951).
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